Introduction
Theoretical developments in international economics are sometimes motivated by empirical findings. The 'new trade theory', for example, was to a large extent inspired by empirical work on intra-industry trade (Neary, 2004b) . This also holds for the recent outburst of research on foreign direct investment (FDI) as one of the driving forces behind the current wave of globalization. Many observers have noted that FDI grows much faster than world merchandise trade (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004) . This is clearly a stylized fact in search of an explanation. For years, students of FDI used the OLI-categorisation scheme of Dunning (1993) to understand why firms engage in FDI. Notwithstanding its usefulness in the case of FDI, a categorisation scheme is not a model. New theories are being developed in which the firm's decision on FDI engagement is determined in a full-fledged micro-economic model. Source: ; data: UNCTAD (2000); 78-22% in value terms, other % in # of deals Interestingly, looking at FDI as a broad category obscures the fact that most FDI is in the form of so-called cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (henceforth: M&As). Figure 1 shows a decomposition of FDI from which it is clear that M&As constitute the bulk of FDI, whereas greenfield FDI is less important than M&As. The main difference between these two investments is that in an M&A "control of assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, the former becoming an affiliate of the latter" (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 99) . Only recently models in international economics have been developed that enable us to understand M&As (Neary, 2004b ). Neary's model takes the standard explanations for M&As a step further. Usually two motives are mentioned to explain M&As: a strategic motive (reduce competition) and an efficiency motive (cost reductions). An explanation of cross-border M&As, however, also has to explain the cross-border part of the deals. Trade theory suggests that comparative advantage could be included in full explanations of M&As, see Neary (2004a) . A different, equally novel line of research in international economics (see Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2004, or Helpman, 2006 , for excellent surveys), seeks to understand the conditions under which firms decide to locate (part of) their production abroad (the off-shoring decision). When they decide to off-shore, some firms do so under the flag of FDI, while other firms go for outsourcing. In this literature, and in contrast to the empirical relevance illustrated in Figure 1 , the role of cross-border M&As is, however, largely ignored. The aim of this chapter is to present stylized facts on cross-border M&As. This is not only interesting in its own right (see also Evenett, 2004) , but may also act as a guide for the recent upsurge of interest in FDI and its alternatives in international economics regarding the facts that the modern theory of FDI should be able to explain. When highlighting the stylized facts in this chapter, we therefore briefly point out those FDI models in international economics that are able to cope with the facts under consideration.
Figure 1 Distribution of different types of FDI
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents basic characteristics of M&As using the database of Thomson Financial Securities Data (Thomson, hereafter) . The advantage of this source over UNCTAD data is that it consists of individual data on each and every M&A, enabling us to look at M&As at a very detailed level. Section 3 provides information at the country level. Section 4 looks at the regional composition of target and acquirer, which are both typically to be found in the OECD countries. Section 5 confronts gross M&As with net M&As and discusses some developments over time, confirming that emerging markets, like China and Eastern Europe, are increasingly becoming net targets. Section 6 argues that the inequality within the set of M&As tends to increase over time. Section 7 discusses the characteristics of firms involved in FDI. Section 8, finally, concludes and summarizes our findings.
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Cross-border M&As: basic characteristics Payment of the deal using shares occurs regularly (9.6 per cent of the deals) and, if so, it is usually completely paid for in shares (on average 73.1 per cent of the deals involving stocks is paid for in stocks). The fact that many takeovers are financed with cash does not imply that shares are not important in those deals: raising cash is very much facilitated if stock prices of the firms involved are high. This might be the motive to announcing takeovers before the actual takeover takes place;
announcements tend to affect share prices in an upward direction (see also Box 1).
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Box 1 Cross-border M&A profitability
For this chapter it is instructive to present a simple way of looking at a cross-border M&A. It is more a way of organizing thoughts than a complete model, but it illustrates the key issues involved. Let "1" and "0" indicate the post-and pre-merger situation, respectively. Then the gain of taking over a Home firm, H G , by a foreign firm is given by:
The first term (in square brackets) relates to the gain in profitability from reduced competition by taking over the domestic firm: the number of domestic firms is reduced by 1 , from n to (n-1). The number of foreign firms, n * , does not change.
The second term indicates the cost of acquiring the domestic firm, This is a function of profits of the target -the more profitable a target is, the higher the take-over costsand the cost of financing the take-over. If the acquirer has a windfall gain, for example, higher share prices due to the takeover, the finance costs are smaller The │.
indicates that other variables are taken as given. The balance between the change in profits and the costs involved in the M&A determines whether or not a takeover will take place. Whether the increase in profits really materializes after the M&A has taken place is another issue, but the equation illustrates how in international economics (the equation is taken from Neary, 2004a) the firm decision on whether or not to engage in a cross border M&A is very simple. The firm (and its organizational set-up) itself is something of a black box and the focus is on how changes in the external environment (fall in transportation costs, lowering of tariffs) might have an impact on equation (1), and thus on the M&A decision.
There are substantial differences between the public status of acquiring and target firms. The majority of acquiring firms are public companies (57.4 per cent), followed by subsidiaries (24.7 per cent), and private firms (14.8 per cent), respectively. The target company, on the other hand, is usually a subsidiary (40.1 per cent), followed by a private company (27.2 per cent) and a public company (26.7 per cent), respectively.
The share of subsidiaries and private companies among the target companies is therefore substantially larger and the share of public companies is substantially lower.
To classify M&As between horizontal and other types of deals (be they vertical or conglomerate), we used the SIC classification of target and acquirer as provided by reduction of competition makes an M&A profitable, which implies that it is rational to wait for other M&As to go first, because this reduces competition and makes the next M&A more profitable than the first one. Second, an M&A wave must stop at some point. Both elements should be incorporated in a full M&A model. Neary (2004a) does just that: waves have to start at some point in time or else M&A profits are foregone. Moreover, since it is a general equilibrium model, the excess supply on the labor market following an M&A (lower wages resulting in higher profits) finally stop the wave.
Countries and M&As in 2005
This section provides an overview of the currently (2005) As suggested by the fact that the USA and the UK take the two top spots in Table 2 both as acquirer and target, there is substantial coincidence between acquirers and targets (large acquiring countries are usually also large target countries, and vice versa). Indeed, of the 20 countries listed as the largest acquirers in value terms in Table 2 , fifteen also appear among the top 20 as largest targets in value terms. Only Switzerland, Egypt, UAE, Japan, and Israel would have to be replaced by Belgium, China, Turkey, Czech Rep., and South Korea. This coincidence is illustrated in Figure   4 using logarithmic scales. The figure also indicates that the Czech Rep. is indeed a relatively large target and the UAE is indeed a relatively large acquirer. The thin line is the 45° line.
What can we conclude from the fact that M&As mostly take place between high income countries? As stated before an important classification in the literature is the difference between so-called horizontal and vertical FDI. The difference is important because in case of horizontal FDI firms are 'market-seeking' (looking for large and profitable markets), in case of vertical FDI firms have a 'factor-market' motive. In the former case firms are interested in the high wages of consumer, instead of low cost in factor markets (for example low wages) as in the latter case. Thus, both forms need very different models. As horizontal FDI seems to dominate the data, models that stress 'market-seeking' reasons to engage in M&As are potentially the most appropriate for empirical research. Having acknowledged this, see also the previous section, these models have trouble explaining FDI in the face of increased economic integration (falling trade costs), see also Evenett (2004, p. 427) . It is here that the models in international economics might gain (Neary, 2005) from differentiating more clearly between various forms of FDI, notably by including cross-border M&As as a separate category of FDI.
Regional distribution of cross-border M&As
In section 3 we showed that the majority of cross border M&As is between relatively rich countries. In the light of the "fear of globalization" debate that we alluded to at the beginning of this section, the increased importance of Eastern Europe and also of East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America as target region provides some evidence that cross-border M&As are increasingly used as a vehicle to invest from high-income countries to lowincome countries. The changes are, however, (still) modest; it remains true even in our regional classification above that the vast majority of FDI takes place between and within the three high-income regions. Table 3 Most noteworthy in Table 3 is, of course, the large share of European firms buying other European firms, which has been close to one third of the world total since 1990.
It seems difficult not to argue that the intra-European M&A activity has been stimulated by the process of EU integration, the completion of the single market. But if this is the case, the modern FDI models that serve as a benchmark for our chapter have some trouble explaining as they predict that (horizontal) FDI would become less important. One explanation (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 3) might be that (independently from the level of trade costs) the fixed cost of taking over another European firm has fallen because of the streamlining of national legislation. Table 3 also shows that the share of intra-regional M&As has been high for AustralAsia and North America (see also below) and that South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa are virtually absent as acquirer and target regions throughout the period. Finally, we focus attention on inter-regional M&As, which gives us an indication of the extent to which different global regions interact with one another. These flows can obviously be (roughly) deduced from Table 3 or the various sub-periods by disregarding the diagonal entries (which sum to about 50 per cent of the total) and readjusting the remaining entries to sum to 100 per cent inter-regional M&As. Figure 7 graphically depicts the inter-regional cross-border connections for the most recent 
Countries and M&As over time
In view of the high coincidence between acquiring and target countries discussed in sections 3 and 4, it is interesting to make a difference between the largest gross acquirers and targets and the largest net acquirers and targets of M&As. Looking at net figures corrects for (country) size differences and reveals possible changes in the direction of FDI flows. Since the value and number of cross-border M&As varies substantially even for the world as a whole, see Figure 3 , it should come as no surprise that this variation is even more substantial at the country level, certainly when we look at net M&A flows. This is illustrated in Figure 8 Table 5a lists the top 10 acquiring countries, consisting of the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, and six European countries (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain). The US and the UK are about equally important in this respect, although the US tops the list in three of the four sub-periods. The role of the Netherlands and Spain as an acquiring nation has become more important in the last 10 years and that of Australia in the last 5 years. In contrast, the role of Japan as an acquiring nation has clearly reduced over time. Table 5b lists the top 10 target countries. Except for Italy and Sweden (which replace Switzerland and Japan) it consists of the same countries as Table 5a . The US is undisputedly the largest target country, followed by the UK and Germany. The role of the UK as a target country has clearly increased over time. Similarly, to a lesser extent, has the role of other European countries, particularly in the last five years. 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986- 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986- 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986- 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986- Finally and most interestingly from the globalization debate perspective, Table 5d lists the top 5 net target countries, consisting of the US, Brazil, Germany, China, and Argentina. Of these five, Brazil and Argentina have been stable net target countries throughout the period, whereas China, like Germany, became an important net target in the last 10 years only. The US has been a primary net target most of the time, switching roles with the UK only in the last five years. The analysis reveals that despite the dominant position of the US, recently high income countries are turning towards emerging markets, of which China stands out as the most recent net target.
Folk wisdom about the increasing importance of China -and other promising markets -thus seems correct in this respect. This also implies a challenge for FDI modeling.
Typically, see Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, chapter 3), when the possibility of M&A as an FDI option is taken into account this is in models of horizontal FDI, which given the facts we have presented so far, should not come as a surprise. But, the information provided by Table 5d suggests that (increasingly?) cross border M&A is also aimed at low(er) income countries where the market seeking aspect is probably far less relevant than the (labor) cost saving argument. This means that cross border M&A should be part of models of vertical FDI as well. It might be that cross border
M&As become an increasingly viable alternative for Greenfield FDI or outright outsourcing in view of the well-known asymmetric information problems (the hold up problem) associated with the FDI-versus-outsourcing decision.
Inequality between cross-border M&As
One of the reasons for the attention for the M&A phenomenon in-and certainly outside academia is undoubtedly the sense of involvement of national pride in M&A deals (either positively or negatively). Another, perhaps even more important, reason for this attention is the size of some of the cross-border M&A. Indeed, some of the deals are so large that they can have a substantial influence on a country's position as a (net) acquirer or target. M&As has become more unequal over time (Evenett, 2004) . This section analyzes that suggestion in more detail. A proper understanding of the degree of inequality of a distribution must, of course, take all observations into consideration, rather than focusing just on the maximum value. An excellent, and popular, method is to construct Lorenz curves, where the observations are ordered in increasing value, with the share of the cumulative number of deals on the horizontal axis and the share of the cumulative value of these deals on the vertical axis. Figure 9 provides examples of these curves in the years 1991, 1999, and 2005 . If all the observations in a particular year had an equal value, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the diagonal. The area below the diagonal and above the curve (times two) therefore provides a measure of the inequality of the observations, a number between 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete inequality) known as the Gini coefficient. We calculated the Gini coefficient for each year of our data set. Figure 10 Cross-border M&As, 1985 M&As, -2005 Gini coefficients and value Cross-border M&As, 1986 -2005; Gini coefficients (left hand scale) and (Evenett, 2004 , Muelfeld et al., 2007 . Once the regulations became more relaxed, the local 'giants' were looking for profitable M&A. Does this make sense from the perspective of the modern FDI theories that play such a dominant role in the current research in international economics? To start with, the idea of merger waves can be explained as equation (1) already suggests that once the initial mergers have taken place and competition is reduced it becomes profitable for other firms to also become engaged in the M&A activity, but the problem is how to explain the initial mergers. The association of the merger wave, with a strong European flavor, with changes in regulation can be aligned with theoretical models of (horizontal) FDI as long as this is looked upon as a decrease in the organizational costs of setting up and arranging a M&A. If these costs are to be looked upon as a fall in trade costs and thus as a manifestation of increased economic integration these models are thus, as we have argued before, not very well equipped to explain the data in Figure 10 . May be, the limits of existing FDI models with more or less all build on equation (1) come to the fore here and to understand what is driving merger waves we might look at alternative theories like the managerial hubris theory (Roll, 1986) . Managers tend to err positively when it comes to the valuation of targets, and thus tend to overpay. Especially during the hay day of the dotcom bubble in the late 1990s this could explain the increase in value of the M&As.
Although managerial hubris is not part of our categorization scheme from box 1, it points to the fact that M&A are facilitated in the upswings of business cycles.
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Looking more closely at individual firms that engage in M&A Until now we have not discussed individual firms. 5 In this section we briefly discuss the main insight that results from the research on FDI and firm heterogeneity namely that within a sector there is considerable firm heterogeneity to the effect that only the most productive firms are expected to be engaged in FDI and thus in cross-border M&A (as an acquiring firm). The idea that firms from the same sector differ (a lot) is probably not a path breaking observation, but for the fact that there is a systematic relation between plant productivity and the mode of entry in international trade. Bernard et al. (2003) show that a systematic relation exists between productivity and whether or not firms are engaged in exports. They show that of 200.000 (US-) firms in their sample only 21 percent report any export. Less than 5 per cent of these firms export more than 50 per cent, which shows that even if firms are engaged in 5 The Thomson data do not allow us to calculate the productivity measures as used by Bernard et al. (2003) or differentiate between domestic sales exports or FDI at the plant level. In this section we review some of the relevant literature that has original plant level data on productivity.
international trade, most are still most active in domestic markets -two-thirds of the exporters export less than 10 per cent of their output. Most interestingly, those that export have higher productivity levels, and thus are able to charge a higher mark-up.
Given the fact that international trade is more costly than domestic sales, only productive firms are able to cover trade costs. Despite these trade costs they can still be competitive in foreign markets, just because they are efficient. So, export reveals high productive plants. Helpman et al. (2004) take this line of reasoning one step further by not only looking at the export decision, but by also taking the FDI decision into account. Because FDI is even more expensive than exports, only the most efficient firms are able to engage in FDI. They find strong evidence for a sample of US and European firms that only the most productive firms are engaged in FDI. Studies like these confirm the notion that transportation costs are not only important to describe international trade patterns, but also FDI flows. We report these results because they also explain why most FDI is between rich countries (see sections 3 and 4). Instead of emphasizing market-seeking arguments, the firm heterogeneity argument points out that most FDI and thus cross border M&A is between rich countries because that is where the most productive firms are located. Our data set, the Thomson data set on M&A, does not allow for an easy differentiation of firms in terms of productivity, but additional stylized facts on the productivity of firms engaged in cross border M&A could help to establish if this new firm heterogeneity literature makes sense when applied to M&A. We leave this for future research.
Summary and Conclusions
The well-known advice of Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) to "estimate, don't test", implies that, given the current state of the theories and the quality of the data, the • most FDI is in the form of cross-border M&As,
• firms engaged in cross-border M&As seem to be 'market-seeking',
• cross-border M&As come in waves (the most recent wave is still unfolding),
• economic integration (international deregulation) stimulated M&As,
• the size of and inequality between M&As grows (over time).
Our contention in this chapter is that these stylized facts drive and should drive theoretical contributions from international economics that try to understand crossborder M&As. A number of recent models that are firmly rooted in the 1 st principles of trade theory, see Neary (2003) , go a long way in explaining some of these facts.
What is still missing, given our stylized facts, is a full-fledged model of M&As. It might of course be that tools of modern international economics do not allow for such an all encompassing theory but ongoing research by economists like Neary, Helpman or Mélitz suggests that our understanding of cross-border M&As will improve in the near future. This is real progress, because from the perspective of mainstream international economics, cross-border M&As has too long been a case of interesting facts in search of a theory.
